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This article surveys relevant 2013 developments in national security law for interna-
tional lawyers.'
I. CFIUS Activity
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is a federal inter-
agency committee chaired by the Department of Treasury and whose members consist of
the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security (DHS), Commerce, Defense, State, and
Energy, as well as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Office of Science
and Technology Policy. 2 CFIUS is charged with the authority to review any transaction
that could result in foreign control of a U.S. business. 3 Despite this broad authority, the
* The committee editors of this article were Captain James D. Carlson, Judge Advocate, U.S. Coast
Guard, and Aaron M. Schmitz, antitrust staff attorney in Washington, D.C. Captain Carlson contributed
"International Response to Iran's Nuclear Program;" Michael J. Lowell, Partner, Reed Smith LLP, and
Michael A. Grant, Associate, Reed Smith LLP, contributed "CFIUS Activity;" Robert McHugh III, Attorney
at Law, contributed "Syria and Chemical Weapons;" Guy C. Quinlan, former Counsel, Clifford Chance and
Rogers & Wells, contributed "Nuclear Arms Control;" and First Lieutenant Sergio L. Suarez, U.S. Army,
J.D. Candidate Seton Hall University School of Law, contributed "Information and Intelligence." The
section on "United States and Allied Cooperation: Technology Sharing and Joint Efforts in CBRN
Detection" was contributed by Jonathan Michael Meyer, Attorney at Law; the section on "Cybersecurity
Developments" was contributed by Geoffrey M. Goodale, Attorney, Trade Law Advisors PLLC. The views
expressed herein by the military officers are those of the authors and are not to be construed as official or
reflecting the views of the Army Chief of Staff or Coast Guard Commandant, or of the U.S. Army or U.S.
Coast Guard.
1. For developments during 2012, see William V. Dunlap et al., National Security Law, 47 INT'L LAW. 453
(2013).
2. Composition ofCFIUS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/inter-
national/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx (last updated Dec. 1, 2010, 8:08 AM).
3. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012) (authorizing CFIUS pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950, as
amended); 31 C.F.R. Pt. 800 (2013) (containing CFIUS regulations).
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focus of CFIUS's review is to identify and address transactions that raise national security
implications. 4
The term "national security" is not defined by CFIUS's authorizing legislation or im-
plementing regulations. But, in 2013, CFIUS reviewed a foreign investment that
stretched the boundaries of that term. Specifically, in June 2013, Shuanghui International
Holdings Limited (Shuanghui), a China-based food company, and Smithfield Foods, Inc.
(Smithfield), a U.S.-based food company, filed a voluntary notice with CFIUS regarding
Shuanghui's proposed acquisition of Smithfield (Smithfield Acquisition).5
CFIUS's review of the Smithfield Acquisition lasted the complete review period of sev-
enty-five days.6 During the review, the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutri-
tion, and Forestry held a hearing to discuss the implications of the Smithfield
Acquisition.7 Despite the extended review and congressional scrutiny, CFIUS approved
the Smithfield Acquisition without any conditions.8
Throughout 2013, CFIUS also engaged in reviews of transactions involving traditional
notions of national security. In January, CFIUS approved the acquisition of Al 23 Systems
Inc. (A123) by the Chinese auto-parts maker, Wanxiang Group Co. (Wanxiang).9 A123
manufactured commercial batteries for automotive use and also held several U.S. govern-
ment defense contracts. In a preemptive move to mitigate CFIUS concerns, Wanxaing
did not purchase A123's government contracts; that portion of A123's business was pur-
chased by Navitas Systems LLC, an Illinois-based battery firm.I0
In February 2013, CFIUS approved the acquisition by CNOOC Limited (CNOOC), a
Hong Kong-based energy company, of Nexen Inc. (Nexen), a Canadian-based energy
company with locations in the United States.I A reported condition of CNOOC's acqui-
sition mandates that CNOOC not have any operational control of Nexen's assets that are
4. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http:/
/www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Pages/Committee-on-Foreign-Investment-in-US.aspx (last
updated Dec. 20, 2012).
5. Christopher Doering, Secretive U.S. Panel Eyes China's Smithfield Deal, USA TODAY (June 10, 2013,
9:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/09/smithfield-foods-pork-foreign-in-
vestment/2396187/.
6. Press Release, Smithfield Foods, Smithfield Foods Announces Update on CFJUS Process (july 24,
2013), availahle at http://investors.smithfieldfoods.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=779949.
7.Smithfield ad Beyond: Examining Foreign Purchases of Americanl Food Companies: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow,
Chairwoman, S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry), availahle at http://www.ag.senate.gov/download/
?id=7a3ffabe-482e-4479-b022-be19b13b1641.
8. The Deal, The Deal No CFIUS Strings Attached to Smithfield Deal, THE STREET (Sept. 9, 2013, 5:02
PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/12031338/1/the-deal-no-cfius-strings-attached-to-smithfield-
deal.html.
9. William McConnell, CFIUS Approval ofA 123 Systems Deal Draws Critics, THE DEAL PIPELINE (Jan. 30,
2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/cfius-approval-of-al23-systems-deal-draws-
critics.php.
10. Press Release, Navitas Systems, Navitas Systems LLC Completes the Acquisition of A123 Systems'
Government Business (Jan. 29, 2013), availahle at http://www.navitassys.com/2013/09/08/navitas-systems-llc-
completes- the-acquisition-of-a 123 -systems-government-business/.
11. Rebecca Penty & Sara Forden, Cnooc Said to Cede Control of Nexens U.S. GulfAssets, BLOOMBERU (Mar.
1, 2013, 6:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-01/cnooc-said-to-cede-control of-nexen-s-u-
s-gulf-assets.html.
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close to U.S. military instillations. 2 CNOOC will retain ownership of and revenue gen-
erated from such platforms but will be removed from operational decisions.
13
Following a CFIUS review in 2012, Ralls Corporation (Ralls), a Chinese-owned Dela-
ware entity, was ordered by President Obama to divest itself of an ownership interest in
four wind farms located near a naval base in Oregon.14 Ralls filed suit challenging the
President's decision. But, on October 10, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia upheld the President's authority by dismissing the Ralls suit.15
In 2013, CFIUS asserted its authority to review transactions post-closing. In Septem-
ber 2013, CFIUS ordered India's Polaris Financial Technology Ltd. to divest its 85.3 per-
cent ownership interest in IdenTrst Inc. (IdenTrst), following a post-closing review of
the deal.16 IdenTrst provides digital identification, authentication, and encryption ser-
vices to banks and U.S. government agencies, among other entities.
On November 22, 2012, Lincoln Mining Corporation (Lincoln), a Canadian company
with U.S. operations, announced a sale of shares to Procon Mining and Tunnelling Ltd.
(Procon). 17 Procon is indirectly owned by a Chinese entity.'8 Lincoln and Procon did
not file a joint voluntary notice with CFIUS until after the sale was completed. Subse-
quently, the companies withdrew their voluntary notice and, by letter to CFIUS, Procon
implemented two remedial steps. First, Procon committed to divesting its entire invest-
ment in Lincoln to a third party. Second, Procon committed to limiting the access to
Lincoln's U.S.-based locations at Bell Mountain, Pine Groven and Oro Cruz properties,
as these locations are near the Fallon Naval Air Station in Nevada and the Marine Air
Corps Station in Yuma, Arizona. 19
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Presidential Statement on Order Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Compa-
nies by Ralls Corporation, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. (Sept. 28, 2012).
15. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, No. 12-1513(ABJ), 2013 WIL 5583847
(D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2013).
16. Foreign Investment Regulation and National Security in MAI, RR DONNELLEY, 4 (Nov. 2013), http://
mergermarketgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/RRD November-2013 CFIUS Final-LR.pdf.
17. Press Release, Lincoln Mining Corp., Lincoln Mining Closes Procon Transactions With $3.4 Million
Financing and Director Changes (Nov. 22, 2013), availahle at http://www.lincolnmrining.com/news/
index.php? &content id=223.
18. Press Release, Lincoln Mining Corp., Divestment of Procon Investment in Lincoln Mining Required
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II. International Response to Iran's Nuclear Program
A. DIPLONIATIC BREAKTHROUGHS
Though sanctions on Iran 20 continued to take their economic toll through 2013,21 in
late November, the so-called P5+122 and Iran signed an historic, albeit short term (i.e. a
six-month term), agreement. 23 The agreement capped continuing efforts throughout the
year between the P5+1 and Iran, coming on the heels of the fifth round of talks in 2013.24
It also concluded a dramatic turnabout in the rhetoric between the United States and Iran,
which began after the June election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. 25
The terms of the agreement were broadly available at the time of this writing. In sum-
mary, Iran agreed to halt progress on its enrichment program 26 and to permit intrusive
monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 27 The P5+1 agreed to
provide "limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible" sanction relief, while maintaining
20. The tension between Iran and the international community stems from disagreement over Iran's obli-
gations to implement nuclear safeguards under the so-called "Safeguards Agreement." Int'l Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA], Agreement Between Iran and the JABA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INTCIRC/214 (May 15, 1974), availahle at
http:// www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/nfcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf. See also James D. Carlson et
al., National Security Law, 47 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. YEAR IN REV. 453, 456 n. 26-28 (2013).
21. See, e.g., Beheshteh Farsimeshani, In Iran, the Wrong People Are Suffering, N.Y. TlvimEs (last updated Jan.
22, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/19/sanctions-successes-and-failures/
in-iran-sancnons-hurt-the-wrong-people; Jay Loschky, Most Iranians Say Sanctions Hurting Their Livelihoods,
GALLUP WORLD (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165743/iranians-say-sanctions-hurting-
livelihoods.aspx.
22. The five permanent members of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council (i.e., the United States,
Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China), which are commonly known as the "P5," plus Germany.
See, e.g., Zachary Laub, The UN Security Council, CFR.ORG, http://www.cfr.org/internalonal-organizations-
and-alliances/un-securiry-council/p31649 (Dec. 6, 2013).
23. Joint Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Iran Foreign Minister Zarif Geneva
(Nov. 24, 2013), availahle at http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124 02_en.pdf.
24. Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, ARMs CONTROL ASS'N (last visited Feb. 4, 2014), http://
www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran#2013 (showing talks were held
in 2013 on Feb. 26-27 and Apr. 5-6 in Almaty Kazakhstan, Oct. 15-16, Nov. 7-10, and Nov. 20-24 in
Geneva); Laura Rozen, US, Iran Teams Head to Istanbul for Nuclear-Experts Talks, AL MONITOR (last visited
Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.al-mo nitor.com/pulse/fa/contents/articles/originals/2013/03/iran-us-nuclear-
tecnical-talks-p51-istanbul.html (showing expert level talks were held in Istanbul on Mar. 17-18, 2013).
25. See, e.g., Jeff Mason & Louis Charbonmeau, Obama, Iran's Rouhani Hold Historic Phone Call, REUTERS
(Sept. 28, 2013, 12:56 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/28/us-un-assembly-iran-idUS-
BRE98Q16S20130928; President Rouhani's Twitter Feed, TWITTER, http://witter.com/HassanRouhani
(last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
26. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran's Nuclear Program (Nov. 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/
11/23/fact-sheet-first-step-understandings-regarding-islamic-republic-iran-s-n [hereinafter WH Press Re-
lease] (stating that Iran is permitted to continue enrichment of low-level uranium); Jason Rezaian, Iran's Top
Officials Hail Nuclear Deal as Beginning of a New Era, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2013), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/tehran-satisfied-with-nuclear-deal/2 013/11/24/2 836224e-5506-1 le3-bdbf-
097ab2a3dc2b story.html (Iranian President Rouhani seems to confirm the temporary nature of the halting
of enrichment activity, declaring "[1]et anyone make his own reading, but this right is clearly stated in the text
of the agreement that Iran can continue its enrichment, and I announce to our people that our enrichment
activities will continue as before.").
27. WH Press Release, supra note 26.
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the vast bulk of sanctions, including the oil, finance, and banking sanctions architecture. 28
The IAEA will perform many of the verification aspects of the agreement, consistent with
their ongoing inspection role.29 Additionally, the P5+1 and Iran will establish a joint com-
mission to work with the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the agreement, address
any issues that arise under the agreement, and work to resolve ongoing concerns regard-
ing Iran's nuclear program (including the possible military dimension of the program and
Iran's activities at Iran's military complex at Parchin).3 0 The agreement is not without its
critics,3 ' and Iran's right to enrich uranium remains at issue.32
In addition to the P5+1's efforts, the IAEA continued its diplomatic efforts with Iran.
The recurring engagement amounted to little more than continued validation of Iranian
intransience, 33 though November also saw progress on this front. On November 11,
2013, the IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano, and the Vice President of Iran and
President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, signed a "Joint
Statement on a Framework for Cooperation." 34 Iran and the IAEA agreed to "cooperate
firther with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all
present and past issues." 35 As a first step, Iran agreed to six practical measures to occur
within three months, with progress monitored by the IAEA:
1. [p]roviding mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the
Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas;
2. [p]roviding mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the
Heavy Water Production Plant;
3. [p]roviding information on all new research reactors;
4. [p]roviding information with regard to the identification of [sixteen] sites desig-
nated for the construction of nuclear power plants;
5. [clarifying] the announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment fa-
cilities; [and]




30. Id.; see also IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security
Council Resolutions in the Islamic Repuhlic of Iran, Report by the Director General, IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65,
Annex, 49-50 (Nov. 18, 2011).
31. See, e.g., Bernie Becker, Top Democrats, Republicans Blast Obamas Nuclear Deal with Iran, THE HILL
(Nov. 24, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-eastnorth-africa/191286-bipartisan-
skepticism-meets-iran-deal.
32. WH Press Release, supra note 26.
33. UN, Iran Nuclear Talks 'Going Around in Circles' UN Official, UN NEws CENTRE (June 3, 2013), http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/htmrl/www.unama- afg.org/news/-pc/-english/2008/html/story.asp?News
ID=45068&Cr=nuclear&Cr1 =iran#.UpBrRSQXQ-s.





PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
476 THE YEAR IN REVIEW
B. CONTINUED SANCTION AcTiviTY
Two thousand thirteen opened with President Obama signing the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013,37 which includes the Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCDA).38 The IFCDA imposed new sanctions against Iran's
energy, shipping, shipbuilding, and port industries, or upon anyone who provides support
or underwriting services to individuals or entities within those industries. 39 Also notewor-
thy, in June, President Obama signed Executive Order 13645 imposing sanctions on Iran's
currency, the rial.40
In late 2012, the Council of the European Union passed Council Regulation No.
1263,41 which amends Regulation No. 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against
Iran.42 It lists items to give effect to earlier trade restrictions on key equipment and tech-
nology that may be used in the petroleum industry (e.g., natural gas, graphite, raw or
semi-finished metals, and software for industrial processes) and that are relevant to Iran's
nuclear, military, or ballistic missile program, or those controlled by the Islamic Revolu-
tionary Guard Corps. 4 3 Exceptions and exemptions are also provided. 44
III. Nuclear Arms Control
In December 2012, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly voted 147 to four to
establish an "open ended working group" (OEWG) to develop proposals for negotiations
leading to "the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons." 45
The four negative votes were cast by the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and
France. 46 In a joint statement, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France ac-
knowledged the existence of an impasse in nuclear disarmament negotiations through es-
tablished channels but rejected participation in the OEWG "or any outcome it may
produce." 47
The establishment of the OEWG followed decades of increasing tension between the
original nuclear powers 48 and non-nuclear weapons States over the implementation of the
37. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632.
38. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, tit. XII(D), 126 Stat.
1645.
39. Id. art. 1244-46.
40. Exec. Order No. 13,645, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,945 (June 3, 2013).
41. Council Regulation 1263/2012, Amending Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 Concerning Restrictive
Measures Against Iran, 2012 OJ. (L356) 34 (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:356:FULL:EN:PDF.
42. Council Regulation 267/2012, Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Iran and Repealing Regula-
tion (EU) No 961/2010, 2012 OJ. (L88) 1 (EU), availahle at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:088:SOM:EN:HTML.
43. Council Regulation 1263/2012, supra note 41, at 34.
44. Id. at 35.
45. G.A. Res. 67/56, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/56 (Jan. 4, 2013), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/481/96/PDF/N1248196.pdfOpenElement.
46. John Burroughs, UN Votes to Establish Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament, US PEACE COUNCIL,
http://uspeacecouncil.org/?p=2212 (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
47. Id.
48. See Nuclear Weapons: "ho Has "hat at a Glance, ARr.ls CONTROL ASS'N, http://www.armscontrol.org/
factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat (last updated Nov. 2013).
VOL. 48
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 477
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was signed in 1968 and entered into force in
1970. 4 9 Under Article II of the NPT, the non-nuclear weapons states agreed "not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons."5 0 Under Article VI, all parties, in-
cluding the p5,51 agreed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relat-
ing to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament."5 2 Subsequently, the P5 repeatedly acknowledged their "unequivocal un-
dertaking to accomplish ... the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nu-
clear disarmament, to which all State parties are committed under [A]rticle VI of the
[NPT]," but they have rejected all requests by the non-nuclear weapons States to set a
definite time line. 3
The OEWG held a series of meetings in Geneva in 2013, and submitted a report 4
discussing such proposals as "comprehensive" multilateral negotiations on a convention
banning nuclear weapons, interim disarmament agreements "with clearly defined
benchmarks and timelines," and a moratorium on "development of new types of nuclear
weapons or upgrading current nuclear weapons systems," and reducing the operational
readiness of nuclear weapons to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.,
In October 2013, the UN General Assembly's First Committee5 6 adopted a resolution
that "welcomes" the report of the OEWG and calls on the next UN General Assembly
session to "firther explore options for taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations, including if necessary through the [OEWG]. ' 7 The vote was 151 to four,
with the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France again casting the only
negative votes. 58
49. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968,21 U.S.T 483,729 U.N.T.S. 161.
50. Id. art. II.
51. "P5" refers to the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, i.e., the United States, Russia, the
United Kingdom, France, and China. See, e.g., Zachary Laub, supra note 22.
52. Id. art. VI.
53. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
May 2010, FinalDocument, T 79, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Part 1 (June 18, 2010) available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=NTT/CONF.2010/50 / 20(VOL.I).
54. U.N. Secretary-General, Proposals to Take Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations for the
Achievement and Maintenance of a World Without Nuclear Weapons, transmitted by Note of the Secretay-General,
U.N. Doc. A/68/514 (Oct. 9, 2013), availahle at https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/a4
5bed59c24a1b6085257b100050103a/82cb5e94fd a3f2e85257bab0067ef80/$FILE/Ao2068%o20514.pdf.
55. Id. at 9-10; John Hallam et al., Abolition 2000 Campaign "Convention/Step One: De-Alerting" A Global
Campaign to De-Alert Nuclear Weapons, ABOL1TION2000, http://www.abolition2000.org/?page-id=1325 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2014).
56. The First Committee, consisting of all U.N. member States, "considers all disarmament and interna-
tional security matters within the scope of the [U.N.] Charter." Disarmament and International Security, GEN.
ASSEMBLY OF THE U.N., http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). First Committee resolu-
tions are normally adopted as a matter of course by the General Assembly when it meets in plenary session.
57. U.N. First Committee Res., Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, 68th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/68/L.34, T 9 (Oct. 18, 2013) available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/
documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com 3/resohitions/L34.pdf.
58. Voting Record Search, UNBISET.UN.ORU, http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?&profile=vot-
ing&menu=search&submenu=power (search by "Keyword"; then search for "Taking Forward Multilateral
Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations").
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In September 2013, the UN General Assembly held its first-ever High Level Meeting
(HLM) on nuclear disarmament.5 9 The HLM, at which many States (but not the P5)
were represented at the head of government or foreign minister level, produced numerous
statements calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 60 As a follow up to the
work done at the HLM, on November 4, 2013, the First Committee, by a vote of 129 to
twenty-eight, adopted a resolution sponsored by the Non-Aligned Movement, calling for
the "urgent commencement" in the UN Conference on Disarmament of negotiations
leading to the "'early conclusion' of a comprehensive convention" prohibiting nuclear
weapons. 61 Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and their allies voted
against the resolution.62 Also, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France issued
a joint statement asserting that "a practical step[-]by[-] step process is the only way to make
real progress' on disarmament and that 'there are no shortcuts." 63
In early December 2013, the UN General Assembly followed up on the First Commit-
tee's work, as well its own work through the HLM, adopting fives resolutions based, at
least in part, on the work done in those fora.64 This includes the First Committee's draft
resolution III, the express follow-up to the 2013 HLM of the UN General Assembly on
Nuclear Disarmament, adopted by a vote of 137 to twenty-eight, with twenty absten-
tions. 65 It calls "for the urgent commencement of negotiations, in the Conference on
Disarmament, for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weap-
ons." 66 The UN General Assembly also adopted the First Committee's draft resolution X
titled "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Accelerating the Implementation of Nu-
clear Disarmament Commitments, ' 67 and draft resolution XVIII titled "Nuclear
Disarmament." 68
On other fronts, in March 2013, the government of Norway hosted a conference on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, in which 127 countries and numerous interna-
59. High-Level Meetings of the 68th Session of the General Assembly Nuclear Disarmament, 26 September 2013,
GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/nucleardisarmament/
(last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
60. See Archive of Statements from the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarma-
ment (26 September 2013), UN.ORG, https://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/nucleardisarmament/state-
ments.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).




64. See Press Release, GAOR, Capping Intensive Disarmament Comm. Gen. Assembly Adopts 53 Texts on
Wide Range of Pressing Int'l Security Concerns (Dec. 5, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2013/ga1 1463.doc.htm. Though the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly were not officially
released as of this writing, they may be viewed as recommended by the First Committee in Report of Novem-
ber 13, 2013. Report of the First Comm., First Comm., 68th Sess., First Comm. Res. II, X, XVII, XVIII,
XXII, XXIII, U.N. Doc. A/68/411 (Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter First Committee Report], available at http://
www.un.org/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=A/68/41 1.
65. Press Release, GAOR, supra note 64.
66. First Committee Report, supra note 64, at 48 T 4.
67. Id. at 64.
68. Id. at 85.
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tional organizations participated. 69 The P5 did not attend but issued a joint statement
expressing concern "that the Oslo Conference will divert attention away from practical
steps to create conditions for firther nuclear weapons reductions."70 The report of the
Oslo Conference concluded it is unlikely that any State or international organization
could mount an effective humanitarian response to a nuclear weapon detonation.71 A con-
ference to follow up on the work in Oslo will be hosted by the government of Mexico in
February 2014. 72
IV. Syria and Chemical Weapons
At the request of President Obama,73 Congress proposed a joint resolution that would
authorize the President to use limited and specific military action against targets in Syria
in response to the August 21, 2013, chemical weapons attack that killed over 1,000 people
in the suburbs of Damascus. 74 On September 6, 2013, Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid filed Senate Joint Resolution 21 (SJ. Res. 21) titled "Authorization for the Use of
Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to Use of Chemical Weap-
ons."75 Subsection (a) of SJ. Res. 21 authorizes the President to use military power76-
under certain conditions and limitations77-to "respond to the use of weapons of mass
destruction by the [g]overnment of Syria in the conflict in Syria" and, inter alia, "to pro-
tect the national security interests of the United States and to protect [U.S.] allies and
partners against the use of such weapons."7s The preamble states that the use of chemical
weapons by Syria constituted a direct contravention of its "legal obligations under the
[UN] Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and the Protocol to the Hague Convention on
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare."79 In addition, the resolution states that the chemi-
cal weapons attack violated the norms set forth in the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
69. Press Release, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Conference: Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear
Weapons (March 4-5, 2013), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/humanita-
rian-efforts/humnimpact_2013.html?id=708603.
70. ]oint Statement of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, REACH
ING CRITICAL WILL (2013), http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/oslo-
2013/P5 Oslo.pdf.
71. Press Release, supra note 69.
72. Mexico Announces Conference on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, INT'L CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/mexico-announces-conference-
on-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons/.
73. Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congressfor Syria Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 2013, at Al, availahle at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.hml.
74. S.J. Res. 21, 113th Cong. Preamble (2013), availahle at http://beta.congress.gov/l13/bills/sjres21/
BILLS- 113 sjres2 lpcs.pdf.
75. Id. § 1; Ramsey Cox, Reid Files Resolution to Authon ;e Force Against Syria, THE HILL (Sept. 6, 2013),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/320695-reid-files-use-of-force-resolu6on-against-syria.
76. S.J. Res. 21 § 2(a).
77. Id. §§ 3-7.
78. Id. § 2(a)(1)-(2).
79. Id. pmbl.
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Destruction (CWC).80 SJ. Res. 21 would constitute specific statutory authority under the
War Powers Resolution."I
The Senate delayed a vote on SJ. Res. 21 at the request of President Obama on Sep-
tember 10, 2013.82 In its alternative, the United States entered into a joint framework
agreement with Russia on September 14, 2013, to submit special procedures to the Execu-
tive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for
the expeditious and safe destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program and the
establishment of proper verification procedures. 83 The agreement, titled "Framework for
the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons" (Framework), took into account Syria's
decision to accede to the CWC and provisionally apply the CWC prior to its entry into
force.84 The United States and Russia agreed in the Framework that a fiture U.N. Secur-
ity Council resolution should provide for a regular review of Syria's implementation of the
decision made by the Executive Council of the OPCW, and, "in the event of non-compli-
ance, including unauthorized transfer, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in Syria,
the UN Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter."85 Chapter VII of the UN Charter enables the Security Council to take military and
non-military measures necessary to restore international peace and security. 86
On September 14, 2013-the same day the Framework entered into force-Syria filed
instruments of accession to the CWC with the UN Secretary-General and declared to
provisionally apply the CWC during Syria's pending entry to the CWC. s7 The CWC
prohibits, inter alia, the production, development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer, and
use of chemical weapons by State parties.8 8 The CWC entered into force in Syria on
October 14, 2013.89
The UN recognizes the OPCW as responsible for activities related to the prohibition
of chemical weapons in accordance with the CWC.90 In particular, under Article II of the
relationship agreement, the OPCW is required to work with the UN Secretary-General
"in cases of the alleged use of chemical weapons involving a State not party to the [CWC]
80. Id.
81. Id. § 2(c)(1).
82. Mark Landler & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Delays Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 2013, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/syrian-chemical-
arsenal.html?_r=0.
83. Media Note, U.S. Dep't of State, Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons (Sept. 14,
2013) (on file with author), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm.
84. Id. Annex A, T 3.
85. Id. at 1.
86. U.N. Charter art. 39; see also id. arts. 40-51.
87. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [hereinafter OPCW], Decision: Destruction of
Syrian Chemical Weapons, at 2, Exec. Council Doc. No. EC-M-33/DEC.1 (Sept. 27, 2013), availahle athttp://
www.opcw.org/fileadin/OPCW/EC/M- 33/ecm33dec0l-e-.pdf [hereinafter OPCW, Decision].
88. OPCW, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Productions, Stockpiling aand Use of Chemical Weap-
ons and on their Destruction, art. I, (Jan. 13, 1993), availahle at http://www.opcw.org/in-
dex.php?eJD=dam frontend push&doclD=6357 [hereinafter OPCW, Convention].
89. OPCW, Decisio, supra note 87, at 2; OPCW, Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convenion,
asat 14 October 2013, Office of the Legal Advisor Doc. No. S/1131/2013 (Oct. 14, 2013) (listing State Parties
to the CWC), available at http://www.opcw.org/index.php?elD=dam-frontend-push&doclD= 16815.
90. U.N. Secretary-General, Agreement Concerning the Relationship Between the United Nations and the Organ-
ization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Annex, art. I, T 1, U.N. Doc. A/55/988 (June 18, 2001), available
at http://www.un.org/documens/ga/docs/55/a55988.pdf.
VOL. 48
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 481
or in a territory not controlled by a State [p]arty to the [CWC]." 9 1 Further, the UN and
OPCW agreed to "explore possibilities for cooperation in the provision of assistance to
States concerned in cases of the use or serious threat of use of chemical weapons, as pro-
vided for in paragraph 10 of Article X of the [CSC]." 92
On September 27, 2013, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2118 and, in
doing so, it endorsed the OPCW Executive Council Decision, EC-M-33/DEC.1, on the
destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. 93 Resolution 2118 welcomed the Framework
agreed upon by the United States and Russia. 94 The OPCW Decision, as part of Resolu-
tion 2118, requires Syria to allow for the initiation of verification activities by October 1,
2013, submit a declaration pursuant to Article III of the CWC by October 27, 2013,
destroy all chemical weapons production and mixing/filling equipment by November 1,
2013, and eliminate all chemical material and equipment in the first half of 2014. 95 On
November 15, 2013, the OPCW Executive Council approved detailed requirements for
the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile in the first half of 2014 and set
removal procedures for certain chemical weapons from Syria for destruction in another
state.
96
V. Information and Intelligence
A. EDWARD SNOWDEN AND THE NSA
On June 14, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice filed criminal charges in the Eastern
District of Virginia against former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward
Snowden, which included "[w]illfil [c]ommunication of [c]lassified [c]ommunications
[i]ntelligence [i]nformation to an [u]nauthorized [p]erson" in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 798(a)(3). 97 The classified communications intelligence that Mr. Snowden allegedly re-
leased included documents discussing the NSA's vast metadata collection program, which
attempted to track domestic and international calls made by Americans from 2006
through 2013.98 Although the content of each call was not recorded, the time, duration,
and numbers were stored in a database, code-named "Pinwale," for later analysis. 99 The
released documents demonstrated the evolution of technological developments that al-
91. Id. Annex, art. II, T 2(c); see Jean Pascal Zanders & Ralf Trapp, Ridding Syria of Chemical Weapons: Next
Steps, Ap.rvs CONTROL TODAY (Nov. 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/act2013-11/Ridding-Syria-of-
Chemical-Weapons-Next-Steps.
92. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 90, at Annex, art. II, T 2(d).
93. S.C. Res. 2118, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/
search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118(2013).
94. Id.
95. Id. Annex 1, 1; OPCW, Decision, supra note 87, at 3; see UN-OPCWJoint Mission, Mandates and Time-
lines, http://opcw.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=6577&language=en-US (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
96. OPCW, Decision, Detailed Requirementsfor the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical
Weapons Production Facilities, Exec. Council EC-M-34/DEC.1 (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://
www.opcw.org/index.php?elD=dam frontend-push&doclD= 16875.
97. United States v. Snowden, No. 1:13 CR 265 (CMH) (E.D. Va. Filed June 14,2013), available athttp://
apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/us-vs-edward-j-snowden-criminal-complaint/496/.
98. James Bamford, They've Got Your Number, TimE Jan. 1, 2013, at 12 (part of a special edition entitled
America's Secret Agencies Inside the Covert World of the CIA, FBI and Special Ops).
99. Id. at 13-15.
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lowed this collection as well as ongoing cooperation between telecommunication compa-
nies, the NSA, and foreign governments. 100 Other documents revealed programs
dedicated to collecting data from internet and e-mail service providers. The revelations of
the NSA's many surveillance programs renewed the debate between national security and
privacy and the legality of the methods used to conduct domestic and international
surveillance.101
B. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) sets forth a statutory framework that
enables government agencies to obtain authorization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court (FISC) to conduct intelligence-gathering operations. 10 2
On November 18, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the order by the
FISC that required Verizon to produce telephone records to the NSA.103 The petition, In
re Elec. Privacy InJbrmation Center, U.S., No. 13-58,104 stemmed from the secret NSA sur-
veillance programs made public by Edward Snowden. The order was pursuant to FISA, as
amended by section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. 05
Currently, certifications made to the FISC are presumed valid and are only subject to
disclosure in specific circumstances in which there is a "misrepresentation of fact" or
"vague identification of the persons to be surve[yed]," as such "disclosure might compro-
mise the ability of the United States to gather foreign intelligence effectively."106
C. SURVEILLANCE OVERSIGHT
The FISC has acknowledged that, while the data collected is broad, any use of the
information received would have to be strictly tailored to identify terrorist communication
and subject to protection of U.S. persons under Attorney General approved guidelines. 1 7
The FISC continues to grant orders authorizing bulk collection of metadata and restricts
100. Id. at 15.
101. David Von Drehle, The Surveillance Society, TIME, Aug. 1, 2013, at 33. An April 2013 poll shows that 81
percent favored increased powers of investigation that law enforcement agencies might use against suspected
terrorists, which would also affect civil liberties. Also, 38 percent favored monitoring cell phones and emails.
The margin of error is +/- 4. Poll, CNN, TImE, AND ORC (May 1, 2013), http://i2.cdn.mrner.com/cnn/
2013/images/05/01/topS.pdf.
102. EDWARD C. Liu, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42725 REAUTHORIZATION OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS
ACT (2012).
103. Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Declines Challenge to NSA on Verizon Records,for Now, ABC NEws (Nov.
18, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/11/supreme-court-declines-challenge-to-nsa-on-ver-
izon-records-for-now/.
104. In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013).
105. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
106. United States. v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 546 (E.D. Va. 2006) (citing United States v. Belfield, 692
F.2d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
107. In re F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from Redacted, BR 13-109,6-7 2013 WIL
5741573 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
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disclosure of such collections, citing the need of the program for overall national
security. 10 8
The information collection debate prompted the Senate to propose legislation aimed at
shielding the public from surveillance. On October 31, 2013, the Chair of the Select
Committee on Intelligence, Senator Feinstein, proposed the FISA Improvement Act of
2013, which would amend Section 501 of FISA by prohibiting bulk collection of commu-
nication records that do not name or otherwise identify either individuals or facilities.109
The order must comply with supplemental procedures rigorously limiting the scope of
information that can be collected." 0
Another bill, the Surveillance Transparency Act of 2013, would enhance mandatory re-
porting by the federal government of electronic surveillance orders.II It would also allow
companies to voluntarily disclose the amount of FISA orders received,11 2 which is cur-
rently prohibited." 3
VI. United States and Allied Cooperation: Technology Sharing and Joint
Efforts in CBRN Detection
On February 21, 2013, the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of International
Law organized a blue ribbon panel titled "Critical Technology Sharing Between United
States and its Allies."11 4 The panel arose out of the need to investigate and offer solutions
to problems the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the DHS encountered
in attempting to share critical technologies that firther high priority U.S. national secur-
ity objectives." 5 The problems experienced by NATO were similar, if not identical, to
the problems encountered by DHS in the technology transfer process, as outlined and
defined in the landmark report "Securing the Homeland."116
The panel was comprised of major government stakeholders, including representatives
from DHS, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Department
of State, and NATO, as well as representatives from industry and private practitioners."
7
The panelists considered and opined on methods to resolve the transfer problems. Sev-
eral suggestions emanated from a desire to institute a government exception to the United
States Munitions List (USML), analogous to Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) 36 gov-
108. Matt Sledge, A Secret Court Judge Warned the NSA It Was Close to Breaking the Law Then Gave It More
Power, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/20/nsa-fisa-court-
opinion n_4311787.html.
109. FISA Improvement Act of 2013, S. 1631, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(i) (2013).
110. Id.
111. Surveillance Transparency Act of 2013, S. 1452, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2013).
112. Id. § 3(a)(1).
113. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1) (2012) (restricting disclosure pursuant to an order under Title V of FISA).
114. Critical Technology Sharing Between the U.S. and Its Allies: Problems and Possible Solutions, ABA SEC. OF
INT'L LAW, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/incategorized/international-law/critical technol-
ogy-sharing-berween the u s and its allies-problemsand-possible solutions.authcheckdam.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2014).
115. Id.
116. Nat'l Research Council, EXPORT CONTROL CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH SECURING THE HOME
LAND (The Nat'l Academies Press 2012), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record id=13369.
117. Critical Technology Sharing Between the U.S. and Its Allies: Problems and Possible Solutions, supra
note 114.
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ernment exceptions, in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)." 8 But, as noted
during the proceedings, it would take an act of Congress to institute an exception to the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) or USML. Because of the restrictions,
and pursuant to the suggestion of the representative from Department of Commerce, it
was understood that part of the solution existed in the increasing migration of important
technologies from the USML to the Commerce Control List, thereby allowing U.S. allies
the ability to exploit STA 36 license exceptions in the EAR in expediting the technology
transfer process." 9
Alternately, panelists suggested implementing exceptions to the ITAR, through multi-
lateral treaties, with such exceptions enjoying the full force and effect of Federal law.120
In addressing the difficulties in critical NATO-U.S. technology transfers, the panel fa-
cilitated greater coupling and front-loading in acquiring Technical Assistance Agreements
and licenses by NATO applicants. Teams from NATO and the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA) learned to better prepare packages for ITAR licensing and collaborated
closely in building arguments for release. The working level now moves faster, without
engaging the entire chain of command, except to provide visibility. Keeping the head
shed out of the details prevents misunderstandings and avoids delays. As a result, the
protective outer layers of U.S. and allied security are being strengthened.
For example, NATO is engaged in developing a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN) Functional Services (FS) architecture (i.e., software tool support and
command/control display interfaces), which requires a Hazard Prediction and Assessment
Capability (HPAC) software, which originates in the United States.' 2 1 Release of HPAC
to NATO is critical to the success of joint U.S.-NATO CBRN detection initiatives.
Also as a result of the panellists' efforts, the DTRA and the Pentagon coupled in push-
ing for the release of the "HPAC Interface Information" document (which is about 100
pages of descriptive text) to the NATO Communications and Information Agency to be
captured in the CBRN FS initial design requirements document.
Currently, the DTRA and the Pentagon are working on the release of the "HPAC
Interface Codes," the actual software codes that allow NATO CBRN FS to directly inter-
face with, and run, the HPAC software through a service-oriented architecture, which
forms the backbone of the CBRN FS. The Interface Codes are the essential parts of the
HPAC release. These codes will enable NATO's quick and seamless integration of the
complete HPAC package into CBRN FS. Presently, HPAC is accessed using the Interface
118. For a primer on export control reform and license exceptions, see U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Export
Control Reform: Fulfilling the Promise (July 23, 2013), http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/
doc download/795-license-exceptions-update-2013 -072213.
119. See, e.g., Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Initial Implementation of Export Control
Reform. 78 Fed. Reg. 22,660 (Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-04-16/
html/2013-08352.htm.
120. Export Controls & Economic Sanctions Committee, Ai. BYR Ass'N, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/com-
mittee.cfm?com=IC716000 (last updated Jan. 7, 2014) (follow "Critical Technology Sharing Semiinar-Feb.
21, 2013 -Presentations (All Speakers)" hyperlink).
121. 1st Meeting of CBRN Function Service Working Group, JCBRN DEFENSE COE, http://www.jcbrncoe.cz/
index.php/events-67/main-events-2013/200-1st-meeting-of-cbrn-functional-service-working-group (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2014).
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Codes through a U.S., vice NATO, server.12 2 The advanced version of HPAC is available
to NATO and the NATO School at O'gau via U.S. personnel stationed at the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the various Joint Force Headquarters, the
Reach Back Centre Element, the Joint CBRN Centre of Excellence at Vyskov, Czech
Republic, and the NATO School.123 U.S. officers stationed at Vyskov,124 SHAPE, and
O'gau are authorized to provide other NATO experts access to HPAC on the U.S. net-
work until the software is released to NATO directly for integration into the alliance
command/control network.
Full HPAC release to NATO's expert users in the command structure is approaching
completion. At this time, the training and eventual software release is to NATO only.
Future releases may include NATO plus countries,1 25 thereby increasing interoperability
between the United States and its allies and broadening the cooperative networks underly-
ing future U.S.-allied security initiatives.
VII. Cybersecurity Developments
Numerous important cybersecurity developments occurred during the past year. As
discussed below, these include (1) the issuance of an executive order on critical infrastruc-
ture cybersecurity, (2) the publication of a report providing evidence of widespread inter-
national cyber-hacking by the Chinese military, (3) the consideration of important
cybersecurity legislation by Congress, (4) revelations that the NSA engaged in considera-
ble cyber-surveillance of both U.S. citizens and foreign persons, (5) the subsequent review
of such operations by a special advisory committee appointed by President Obama, and (6)
the passage of a resolution on cybersecurity protections and surveillance limits by the ABA
House of Delegates.
To address actual or potential cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure (CI), Presi-
dent Obama issued Executive Order 13636 on February 12, 2013.126 Key goals of Execu-
tive Order 13 63 6 include (1) expanding to other CI sectors an existing DHS program for
information sharing and collaboration between the government and the private sector, (2)
establishing a consultative process for identifying high-priority CI warranting protection,
(3) requiring that the National Institute of Standards and Technology serve as the lead
entity in developing a "Cybersecurity Framework" of standards and best practices for pro-
tecting CI, and (4) directing U.S. government agencies to determine the adequacy of cur-
rent requirements and their authority to establish additional requirements to address
risks.127
122. Personnel within the Joint Chiefs of Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (-8)
are closely overseeing the full release of HPAC.
123. The latest version of HPAC is used to train the students in its application; however, the software is not
distributed, since the complete software release is in process.
124. Vyskov is the site of the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Centre of
Excellence, which hosts the new CBRN Reach Back Coordination Element, which will be task able by the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe to support NATO operations and NATO members' national civilian
agencies. JCBRN DEFENSE COE, http://jcbrncoe.cz/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
125. Here, "NATO plus countries" refers to NATO, any member of NATO, Australia, Israel, Japan, New
Zealand, and South Korea.
126. Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 F.R. 11739 (2013).
127. Id.
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Shortly after Executive Order 13636 was issued, new headlines about cybersecurity vul-
nerabilities were made when Mandiant Corporation (Mandiant) published a report in late
February 2013, in which it asserted that the Chinese military was a driving force behind a
Chinese hacking group known as APTI.12 8 Specifically, Mandiant provided compelling
evidence that APTI had stolen hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 141 organiza-
tions, spanning twenty industries dating back to 2006, and that the totality of the evidence
supported the conclusion that APTI was, in fact, the Second Bureau of the People's Lib-
eration Army General Staff Department's Third Department, which is more commonly
referred to as Unit 61398.129
Within two months of Mandiant's report, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA).130 The main goals of this bill are
to help defend against cyber-attacks on critical national infrastructure and against other
Internet attacks on private firms through voluntary private sector identification and shar-
ing of cybersecurity threat information with the U.S. government.' 3 '
Shortly after CISPA was passed by the House, Edward Snowden, a NSA contractor,
fled the United States to Hong Kong (in late May 2013), and, while seeking political
asylum in Hong Kong and then Russia, Snowden disclosed what is believed to be upwards
of 200,000 classified NSA documents to the press.' 32 Through those documents and in-
terviews were granted to various media sources by Snowden, who was granted political
asylum by Russia on August 1, 2013, it was revealed that the NSA had engaged in massive
cyber-surveillance operations on both foreign nationals, including leaders of close U.S.
allies, and on U.S. citizens. 33
As a result of these revelations, on August 12, 2013, President Obama directed that a
National Intelligence Review Group on Intelligence and Communications (Review
Group) be created to review the NSA's surveillance operations. 134 On December 13,
2013, it was reported that the Review Group, which included Richard Clarke, Michael
Morell, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, and Peter Swire, planned to recommend to Presi-
dent Obama that certain changes be made to current surveillance operations, including,
among other things, (1) requiring more direct oversight by senior White House officials
as to which foreign leaders are monitored, (2) codifying and announcing steps as that will
be taken to protect the privacy of foreign persons whose telephone records and Internet
communications are collected by the NSA, and (3) creating an organization of legal advo-
cates who could argue against lawyers for the NSA or other U.S. government agencies
before the FISC with respect to certain surveillance requests.135
128. MANDIANT CORP., APTL: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA'S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS (2013), available at
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/.
129. Id. at 2-6.
130. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), H.R. 624, 113th Cong. (2013).
131. Id.
132. Michael Scherer, Edward Snowden: The Dark Prophet, TimE (Dec. 23, 2013), http://poy.ime.com/2013/
12/1 1/runner-up-edward-snowden-the-dark-prophet/.
133. Id.
134. Presidential Memorandum on Reviewing Our Global Signals and Intelligence Collection and Commu-
nications Technologies, 78 Fed. Reg. 49,653 (Aug. 15, 2013).
135. David E. Sanger, Obama Panel Said To Urge N.S-A. Curbs, N.Y. TmEs, Dec. 13, 2013, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/world/americas/obama-panel-said-to-urge-nsa-curbs.html? r=0.
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Other organizations also urged that the U.S. government do more to protect against
cybersecurity threats. For example, at the ABA's Annual Meeting that was held in San
Francisco in August 2013, the ABA House of Delegates voted to adopt a cybersecurity
resolution, which the ABA Section of International Law's Cybersecurity Task Force
helped to draft, that "condemns . . . intrusions into the computer systems and networks
utilized by lawyers and law firms" and urges federal, state and other governmental bodies
to "examine" and "amend" existing laws to fight such intrusions.
1 36
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